In 2020, Eurofound conducted the first large-scale Living and Working in the EU e-survey to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s living and working conditions across the European Union. Since 2022, the thematic scope of the e-survey has been broadened to measure the long-term consequences of the pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rising cost of living. A new area of focus in the 2025 (eighth) round of the survey is climate and environment, with questions about people’s experiences of climate impacts and their concern about future risks. 

The e-survey uses a non-probability sampling approach, via which respondents are primarily recruited online through targeted social media advertisements, supplemented by snowball sampling, whereby initial respondents disseminate the survey to others within their networks. The resulting sample is non-representative of the general population, therefore. In addition, respondents from previous survey rounds are invited to participate in subsequent rounds, forming a regularly updated but also non-representative panel.

To improve representativeness, post-stratification weighting was applied to align the sample with the demographic composition of the population of the EU27 and that of each individual Member State. Weighting factors in Round 8 were based on gender, age, education level and region.

Since 2020, economic strain (measured as the proportion of respondents who said it was ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to make ends meet for their household) has fluctuated across all age groups, though with notable age differences (Figure 1). Respondents aged 50–64 have consistently reported the highest levels of economic strain, rising from around 27% in 2020 to nearly 40% in 2025. The 35–49 age group displays a comparable trend, with 37% reporting economic strain in 2025, after a decline in 2023. 

Among younger respondents, economic strain peaked in 2022 at about 28%, then dropped in 2023, before settling at around 20% in 2025. Levels of financial difficulty were lowest in the oldest age group (65+) in the first round of the e-survey (2020) but then increased steadily over time, from about 17% to almost 29% in 2025, narrowing the gap between this group and younger respondents. Overall, economic pressures seem to have intensified for respondents across all age groups since 2020, but especially for the middle-aged. 

Lower-income households facing the most hardship

Since 2022, when income data became available, the survey has measured the gap in economic strain between income groups – and it is widening. While most higher-income households continue to cope comfortably, financial hardship has deepened among lower- and middle-income families (Figure 2). 

In 2025, 61% of low-income households report financial difficulty, up from 40% in 2023 and the highest level observed since 2022, reflecting ongoing cost-of-living pressures. Among medium-income households, economic strain increased from 21% in 2022 to 30% in 2025, suggesting that financial stress affects more than just the most vulnerable groups. Meanwhile, the share of high-income households experiencing difficulty has remained low and stable, at around 9%, indicating that higher-income households have been largely insulated from recent cost pressures.  

Arrears and financial insecurity rising, despite drop in inflation 

In 2025, 18% of respondents across the EU report recent arrears on utility bills, while 20% expect to experience payment difficulties with these in the next three months. The fact that both figures have increased since the previous (2024) survey (from 15% and 18%, respectively) suggests that financial pressures may still be rising, despite a recent drop in inflation.

Figure 3: Proportion of respondents reporting past and expected arrears in utility bills, EU, 2025 (%)

Deprivation

Respondents were asked whether or not they are able to afford certain basic items. Figure 7 illustrates the total share of respondents in low- and high-income households unable to afford each item in 2025. 

Income-related inequality remains substantial across all areas of material deprivation. The largest gaps between high- and low-income respondents are in relation to the (un)affordability of furniture, holidays and leisure activities, indicating that lower-income households are much more likely to lack access to non-essential but important aspects of daily life and social participation. Even for basic needs, particularly a nutritious meal at least every second day, the gaps are large, highlighting persistent disparities in living standards. 

While deprivation affects many households, low-income families experience a far broader range and greater depth of hardship, particularly in terms of maintaining a comfortable standard of living. Since 2023, when deprivation was first measured in the e-survey, average deprivation levels have remained relatively stable, but income gaps have widened slightly for most items, especially keeping out of arrears (+9 percentage points), spending money on oneself (+8 percentage points) and leisure activities (+7 percentage points), suggesting that cost-of-living pressures have deepened inequality rather than changed overall deprivation rates. 

To monitor how respondents perceive their personal prospects for the future, their optimism levels were measured. High levels of optimism are associated with higher resilience and greater trust. The survey found, however, that optimism has declined across all age groups (Figure 8). The sharp drop in 2022 (measured around the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine) stands out, but optimism as measured by the survey has not recovered since, even among the youngest and most optimistic respondents. Such a persistent decline in optimism may be a warning sign of growing insecurity or dissatisfaction and likely reflects the difficult economic context – outlined in the previous section – created by sustained cost-of-living pressures, rising housing insecurity and limited improvement in living standards. 

Respondents who are optimistic about their own future also report the highest average life satisfaction, measured on a 10-point scale. The life satisfaction rate among the most personally optimistic is 7.6, compared with just 4.3 among those who are pessimistic (Figure 9). Regarding optimism about the country’s future, the pattern is similar, although the actual scores indicate that personal optimism has a stronger bearing on life satisfaction. 

Risk of depression continues to rise

The e-survey findings in general suggest enduring mental-health challenges among respondents, with well-being failing to return to the levels observed during the early part of the pandemic and a consistently large share remaining at risk of depression. 

Mental well-being, as measured by the e-survey, has fluctuated over the past five years, with average WHO-5 scores ranging from around 44 to 53 points (Figure 10). A score of 50 or below can indicate a risk of depression.  

The mean WHO-5 score measured among respondents was highest in summer 2020, following the lifting of initial COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, but has since shown a gradual decline, reaching one of its lowest levels in spring 2024, before partially recovering in spring 2025. 

Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents at risk of depression has remained persistently high (between 42% and 60%). In spring 2025, around 57% of respondents scored below the WHO-5 threshold, suggesting that more than half the population may be experiencing low psychological well-being. 

Figure 11 shows changes in work-location patterns among male and female respondents who say their job is teleworkable. The survey first included a question on the teleworkability of jobs in 2022, since when there has been a steady decline in the share of respondents working exclusively from home: from 21% to 15% among men and from 26% to 14% among women.

Over the same period, combined work arrangements have become considerably more common, especially among men. Meanwhile, the proportion working solely at the workplace remains relatively stable, albeit registering a slight decrease. In general, the shift towards hybrid work models has continued since the end of the pandemic, with gender differences narrowing over time, highlighting the ongoing need for better digital infrastructure and equal access to remote-work opportunities. 

An estimated 38.5% of jobs in the EU are potentially teleworkable (EU Labour Force Survey, 2020). Respondents to the Living and Working in the EU e-survey report a higher share of teleworkable jobs (53% in 2025). The findings presented below should be interpreted in this context.

Majority prefer to work regularly from home

In line with the shift to hybrid working and the decline, since the end of the pandemic, in working exclusively from home (which has stabilised at around 15%), the preference for working from home several times a week has increased. About half of men (50%) and more than half of women (54%) would prefer to work from home regularly, up from around a quarter of respondents in 2021. 

Figure 12 illustrates the extent to which workers’ current work arrangements match their preferences for teleworking. The largest proportions of respondents (particularly men) are limited in their preferences by a non-teleworkable job. Women’s actual working arrangements (whether home-based or hybrid) match their preferences more often than men’s. Around one-fifth of both men and women would like to telework but are currently based at their workplace. Only a small proportion of workers (3%) telework despite preferring not to. A further 17–18% report neutral preferences regarding telework.

Balancing work and family life remains difficult for some 

Whether respondents’ preferences align with their actual work arrangements matters for work–life balance, with constrained teleworkers reporting the highest levels of fatigue and their aligned counterparts experiencing the lowest (Figure 13). 

About one-third of workers worry about work frequently, with little difference between the genders. Women are more likely than men to feel too tired after work to complete household tasks (46% compared with 37%). In addition to reporting the highest levels of fatigue, constrained teleworkers experience the most conflict between work and family life, including difficulty concentrating at work. These respondents are likely to have the most family responsibilities and stress, either at work or at home. Meanwhile, the lowest levels of work–family conflict are reported by respondents with a neutral preference, followed by those whose work arrangements match their preferences and those in non-teleworkable jobs. Interestingly, reluctant teleworkers report high levels of worry about work but less family conflict, possibly reflecting fewer family responsibilities or greater job insecurity.  

Greater economic strain coincides with lower trust in institutions 

Trust in institutions has fluctuated among survey respondents since 2020. Comparing trust in national governments and in the EU (Figure 14), the latter rates higher (on a scale of 1 to 10) among all age groups, but especially among younger adults, in all rounds of the e-survey.

Figure 14: Average trust in national government and in the EU, by age group, 2020–2025 (scale 1–10)

Despite the increased reliance on social media, people in the EU generally remain critical of it, rating it lowest in terms of trust across all institutions, systems and media (Figure 15).

The police remains the most trusted institution on average, with Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus being notable exceptions. All three countries experience generally low levels of trust in all the institutions, however. Trust in the healthcare system is mid-range across the EU and higher in western Member States. Interestingly, it is lower than expected in some Member States with traditionally good healthcare systems, such as France, Germany and Sweden. Trust in pension systems follows a similar pattern to healthcare: relatively high in many western and northern Member States but noticeably lower in several southern and eastern Member States. This suggests broader concerns about long-term financial security in countries already experiencing greater economic strain.  

In general, people in the EU tend to trust their local government authorities more than the national government, with the exception of Sweden and Denmark. Trust in the EU, meanwhile, remains relatively high, with only small variations across Member States. Levels of trust in the news media, on the other hand, are relatively low across the EU, with only respondents in Finland rating it above 5.5. Generally, when trust is low in a country it is low for all institutions, rather than it being a case of one institution experiencing significantly lower trust than others. This indicates a more general sense of distrust in these countries. The same is true of countries with high levels of trust, where most institutions, systems and media (except for social media) are rated similarly. 

Declining trust in institutions

Across income groups, differences in levels of trust and satisfaction with democracy are considerable and consistent, mirroring the growing economic strain discussed previously (Figure 18). High-income respondents report the highest levels of trust across almost all domains. In contrast, trust levels among low-income respondents are lower. Gaps extend beyond institutions: confidence in the news media is substantially lower among low-income respondents, as is satisfaction with democracy. The biggest gap by income level, however, is in relation to trust in the EU. 

These results suggest that the financial pressures highlighted previously (greater difficulty making ends meet, higher arrears and low savings buffers) are closely associated with lower levels of trust and reduced satisfaction with democratic functioning among those facing the greatest economic hardship. 

In 2025, for the first time, the Living and Working in the EU e-survey includes a set of questions on environmental issues. Developed together with the European Environment Agency, the questions asked respondents about their experiences and perceptions of climate change, whether they had adjusted their behaviours and, if so, how. The following section contains an overview of some of the findings in this regard. More detailed analyses of the responses will be provided in forthcoming publications.  

Vast majority impacted by climate change 

Across all Member States, more than 80% of respondents experienced at least one of these climate-related events where they live in the past five years: feeling too hot at home; too hot at work or school; too hot in the neighbourhood; floods, wind damage, forest fires or smoke; more insect bites; or problems getting enough safe and clean water (Figure 19). In southern and central European Member States, nearly all respondents experienced at least one of these events, and experiencing four or more was most commonly reported by respondents in Greece, Cyprus and Croatia. While fewer respondents in northern Member States have been impacted by climate-related adverse events, nevertheless 60% experienced at least one of them.  

Age and personal experience shape concern about the environment 

Respondents’ experiences of adverse impacts of climate change appear to be highly relevant to their level of concern about environmental issues. In addition, the survey findings reveal some interesting age patterns (Figure 20). Among those who have experienced no climate impacts, concern is relatively low to moderate, with middle-aged respondents in this group emerging as the least concerned (40% of those aged 35–49 report being ‘not at all concerned’ about environmental issues). Older respondents (65+) who have experienced no impacts have a higher baseline concern: one in five is ‘very concerned’ and only 15% are ‘not concerned’. 

Attitudes shift substantially across all age groups, however, when it comes to those who have experienced one to three climate impacts. The proportion of these respondents who are ‘very concerned’ is approximately double that of those who have experienced no impacts (11% versus 28% among 16–34-year-olds, for example). In this case, the youngest and the oldest respondents appear to be the most worried (28% and 26%, respectively). 

For respondents who have faced four or more climate impacts, the level of concern is, unsurprisingly, high in every age group. More than 40% of 16–34-year-olds and half of those aged 65+ report being ‘very concerned’. Only a very small minority say they are ‘not at all concerned’.